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Liability and Responsibility of
Bank Directors: Being Alert to
Troubled Times
BY LAWRENCE K. BANKS* AND PAULA S. HOSKINS**
INTRODUCTION
Recent bank failures' and the competitive climate in which
banks and other financial institutions operate today2 make the ex-
amination of the liability and responsibilities of directors of state
and national banks particularly appropriate. In addition, there is
an increasing disparity in the sophistication of management and
directors of the respective institutions. While large institutions hire
professional directors, many smaller community oriented banks
continue to attract directors primarily because of the honor of serv-
ing on a bank board. Both professional and honorary directors
need to be aware of the liability and potential risk accompanying
service on a bank board.'
Recently the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
* Member of the firm of Greenebaum Doll & McDonald, Lexington, Kentucky. A.B.
1965, Duke University; LL.B. 1967, Duke University; LL.M. Taxation 1971, Georgetown
University.
** Associated with the firm of Greenebaum Doll & McDonald, Lexington, Kentucky.
B.A. 1973, Western Kentucky University; J.D. 1979, University of Kentucky.
The authors express their appreciation to Richard T. Broida and Michael C. Slone for their
assistance in the preparation of this Article.
I See generally McCue, No Immediate Dropoff in Failure Rate, Am. Banker, Jan.
6, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (FDIC anticipates that the number of 1984 bank failures will be close
to the post-1939 record number that failed in 1983); Failures Leave Tennessee Banks in
State of Flux, Am. Banker, Jan. 3, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (stating 12 Tennessee banks failed
in 1983).
2 See, e.g., FDIC Chairman Stresses That New Controls Are Needed for Bank and
Thrift Regulation, [Report Bulletin 20] 21 CONTROL OF BANKINO (P-H) 20.4 (Mar. 31,
1983) (Chairman William M. Isaacs of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
urged the adoption of new controls to "deal with an increasingly deregulated and com-
petitive banking environment.").
I See, e.g., First State Bank v. United States, 599 F.2d 558, 562 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[i]f,
through recklessness and inattention to the duties confided to him, frauds and misconduct
are perpetrated by other officers and agents or codirectors, which ordinary care on his part
would have prevented, [a director of a bank] is personally liable for the loss resulting.")
(emphasis added) (quoting I MicmE oN BANKS AND BANKING 280 (1973)).
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announced that more federally insured banks failed in 1983 than
in any year since 1939. 4 In 1982 and 1983, an aggregate of ninety
federally insured banks failed,5 including twelve in Tennessee.6 The
number of banks which are characterized by the FDIC as problem
institutions' has grown from 369 in 1982 to a present figure of 631.8
Two of the largest bank failures in history occurred during 1983.9
In addition, federally insured savings and loan associations ex-
perienced one of their worst periods since, if not including, the
Depression.'" In fact, the liquidity problems experienced by one
California savings and loan were so severe that federal regulatory
agencies approved the first acquisition in history of an out-of-state
thrift institution" by a bank holding company.' 2
Thrift institutions, national banks, state banks, insurance com-
panies and brokerage houses all face substantial changes in the
marketplace in which they operate. As a result of federal
' See McCue, supra note 1, at 19, col. I (in 1983, 48 federally insured banks failed,
while 60 failed in 1939).
Id.
See Failures Leave Tennessee Banks in State of Flux, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1.
One of the 12 which failed was United American Bank of Knoxville which had $590 million
in deposits and $791 million in assets, making it the fourth largest bank failure in the history
of the FDIC. Id. Its failure precipitated the collapse of the banking empires of C.H. and
Jake Butcher in Tennessee and Kentucky. On January 6, 1984, Farmers Bank & Trust of
Tennessee closed to become the thirteenth such failure in Tennessee since United American
Bank of Knoxville closed in 1983.
' Problem institutions are banks to which the FDIC has given a rating "of four or
five on a scale of one (good condition) to five (poor condition)." McCue, supra note 1,
at 19, col. 1. A rating of four is assigned to banks with "serious financial and operational
weaknesses." Id. Banks which have "an extremely high or near-term probability of failure"
are given a rating of five. Id.
I Id. This number represents 4.3% of the 14,674 federally insured banks, up from
2.5% in 1982. Id.
' See Commercial Bank Failures of 1983, Am. Banker, Jan. 6, 1984, at 6, col. 1.
The Drydock Savings Bank, with assets of $2.5 billion, merged into the Dollar Savings Bank
of New York on February 9, 1983. United American Bank of Knoxville closed on February
14, 1983, with deposits of $794 million. Id.
"0 See McCue, supra note 1, at 19, col. 1. In 1983, 52 savings and loan associations
insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) were closed or
merged with other associations. See id.
" "Thrift institutions" include savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks
and credit unions.
"2 See Citicorp Acquires Fidelity, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1982, at Dl, col. 6. In
September 1982, Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association of San Francisco was ac-
quired by a subsidiary of Citicorp with the approval of the FSLIC, the Federal Reserve
Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. See id.
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deregulation," banks face increased competition from insurance
companies, brokerage houses and similar new entrants into the
financial marketplace.' 4 Banks and thrift institutions will compete
more directly as they acquire businesses in areas which historically
have been denied them, including real estate, investment banking,
insurance and securities brokerage.' 5 In addition, the territorial
franchise historically enjoyed by banks and thrift institutions is
disappearing as regional and national banking becomes more
common.' 6 In anticipation of the advent of nationwide banking,
major financial institutions are making direct and indirect acquisi-
tions of non-bank financial institutions and are forming de novo
non-bank enterprises across the country.17
" See, e.g,. Deposit Insurance Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) This Act removed the interest rate
differential between banks and savings and loan associations, authorized insured NOW ac-
counts to allow banks to compete with money market funds, increased lending and bor-
rowing limits for single borrowers, authorized federally chartered "banker's banks," and
allowed bank holding companies to engage in the insurance business in limited circumstances.
Federal regulatory agencies have also allowed banks to expand into new areas of activity.
For example, the Comptroller of the Currency recently allowed a national bank to par-
ticipate in the placement of real estate equity interests in connection with its loans to owners
and developers. OCC Interpretive Letter, 22 CONTROL OF BANKING (P-H) 3999.119 (Sept.
21, 1983).
The Comptroller has also allowed companies in the insurance, real estate and securities
industries to acquire "nonbank banks" which are not subject to the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act because they do not make commercial loans and/or do not take deposits. See,
e.g., [Report Bulletin 121 22 CONTROL OF BANKING (P-H) 12.4 (Dec. 8, 1983) (investment
company chartered a trust company); [Report Bulletin 11] 22 CONTROL OF BANKING (P-H)
11.11 (Nov. 23, 1983) (company involved in consumer and real estate finance and in-
surance converted a subsidiary to a national bank making no commercial loans). The Comp-
troller imposed a moratorium on such applications beginning April 6, 1983. See id. at
11. 1. Bills are currently before Congress that would expand interstate banking and allow
bank holding companies or their subsidiaries to deal in a wide variety of financial services,
including mutual funds, insurance services, municipal bond underwriting and real estate
services. See [Report Bulletin 12] 22 CONTROL OF BANKING (P-H) 12.2 (Dec. 8, 1983);
[Report Bulletin 2] 22 CONTROL OF BANKING (P-H) 2.2 (July 21, 1983).
" See Money, Inc.: Wall Street Mergers May Basically Change U.S. Financial System,
Wall St. J., April 22, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
" See Bank Services Under Review, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1983, at D2, col. 1; Fed.
To Let Banks Serve as Discount Brokers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1983, at Dl, col. 1. See
generally Despite Greater Risks, More Banks Turn to Venture Capital Business, Wall St.
J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 33, col. 4 (noting that federal regulators were allowing banks to in-
vest up to five percent in venture-capital subsidies).
"6 See Quickening Pace of Bank Mergers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1983, at D8, col. 4.
," See Out of State Holdings by Banks Concern Fed, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1982,
at D1, col. 1.
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These major changes in the competitive environment have oc-
curred despite a period of deep recession and high inflation. In an
unprecedented period of economic volatility, commercial and mort-
gage interest rates over the last five years have fluctuated widely."5
The Federal Reserve Board has been attempting to bring inflation
under control by governing the money supply and the federal funds
rate which in turn affect commercial and mortgage loan rates.1 9
In Kentucky, anticipated changes of the laws prohibiting multi-
county banking0 and multi-bank holding companies" have resulted
in numerous bank acquisitions, as well as the formation of chain
bank organizations." The collapse of the Butchers' banking chain
and the consequent changes of ownership caused intense activity
by the Kentucky Department of Banking, and resulted in the in-
troduction before the 1984 legislature of a multi-county banking
bill. 3
In this rapidly changing, high-risk environment, a bank director
must prepare his or her bank to survive and compete. More im-
portantly, the director of a troubled or failed bank must deal with
concerned regulators, outraged creditors and stunned shareholders.
" For example, the prime rate fluctuated from 15.25% in January 1980 to 20%o in
April 1980, 11 % in July 1980, 21.5 % in December 1980, and 11 % in February 1983. See
Have Interest Rates Peaked?, NEwswEEK, Jan. 5, 1981, at 45; How High Will Interest Rates
Rise?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., Aug. 22, 1983, at 64; Impact of Soaring Interest Rates-
What's Ahead, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 22, 1980, at 53.
11 See statement of Paul A. Volcker, 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 842, 845 (1983).
20 See Ky. REv. STAT. § 287.180 (Cum. Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
21 KRS § 287.030(3) (1981).
22 The Federal Reserve Board defines chain banking as a situation in which an "in-
dividual, or group of individuals control two or more banks." For example, a chain bank
organization would exist if an individual "owns or controls 25 percent or more of the shares
of two or more banks; or otherwise exercises a controlling influence over the management
or policies of the bank." Federal Reserve Board Letter, 4 FED. BANKiNG L. REP. (CCH)
43,061D (Mar. 15, 1983). In a recent order approving the formation of a one bank holding
company in Kentucky, the Board stated that the holding company's principal stockholder
controlled a chain banking organization due to his ownership of 49% of the voting shares
of two other Kentucky one-bank holding companies. Order of the Federal Reserve Board,
69 Fed. Res. Bull. 863 (1983).
23 Shortly after the collapse of the Butchers' banking chain, Governor Brown ap-
pointed a task force chaired by the Kentucky Banking Commissioner to study ways to
revamp the state's banking statutes and regulations. The task force recommended passage
of a multi-bank holding company bill. See Task Force Endorses Multibank Proposal,
Courier-Journal, Aug. 19, 1983, at C8, col. 5; Banking Panel Wraps Up Its Multibank Pro-
posal Package, Courier-Journal, Aug. 12, 1983, at B6, col. 1.
LIABILITY OF BANK DIRECTORS
This Article will examine the responsibility of such directors to the
bank's shareholders, regulators and creditors within the context of
laws relating primarily to banking.24 While a bank director will be
held to have general knowledge of all banking laws, the remainder
of this Article is limited to those areas in which director involve-
ment is believed to be most critical and where violation can result
in significant personal liability for the director. 5
I. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF BANK DIRECTORS
The fundamental responsibility of bank officers and directors
is to exercise reasonable care to operate a healthy bank in a sound,
safe and legal manner for the benefit of its depositors, shareholders,
employees and creditors. "6 This standard is difficult to apply due
to the various interpretations regarding what constitutes safe and
sound banking practices.27 Further complicating a proper
understanding of the duty owed by bank directors are the differ-
ing and sometimes competitive public and private interests affect-
ing banks. Fortunately, directors are not without some guidance
to assist them in working through this maze of contradiction.
The responsibility of bank directors can be divided into several
major areas: (1) choosing capable management to operate the bank
on a day-to-day basis; (2) establishing policies for management to
follow which relate to the sound and healthy operation of the bank
" This Article does not deal with areas of the director's liability common to all cor-
porations such as securities regulation, take-overs, shareholder battles and duties of the
majority to the minority shareholders. Moreover, the Article does not attempt to provide
an all inclusive discourse on the laws of every state which govern the conduct of banks
and their business. Nor does the Article address the entire body of federal law and regula-
tions on the subject. The analysis is restricted to those areas which most directly involve
the risk of personal civil liability to a director.
" Excluded from the discussion are criminal penalties such as 12 U.S.C. § 18180)
(1982) which provides for a $5,000 fine and/or imprisonment for not more than one year
for a director who continues to conduct bank affairs after being suspended by the FDIC.
Also excluded from this Article are other civil sanctions which may be assessed by a federal
or state bank regulatory agency, including use of letter agreements, issuance of cease and
desist orders, suspension or removal from office. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818.
21 Cf. Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F. 1010 (W.D. Ark. 1907) (bank directors have the
duty to exercise the care of an ordinary, prudent person); Scott's Ex'rs v. Young, 21 S.W.2d
994 (Ky. 1929) (directors who exercise ordinary care are not liable for bank failure).
27 Compare Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 171 N.E. 42 (Mass. 1930) with Briggs
v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
1983-84]
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and which comply with all federal and state laws and regulations;
and (3) establishing review procedures for the appropriate im-
plementation of those policies.28 In addition, to ensure that its
responsibilities have been properly discharged, the board of direc-
tors should audit the bank's performance to confirm the accuracy
and reliability of management's reports on the condition and opera-
tions of the bank.29 When the directors fail in these tasks, and the
bank suffers a loss as a result, directors may be exposed to per-
sonal liability for neglect of their common law duties or breach
of their statutory duties.3"
In Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown,3 a 1930 decision by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, a bank brought suit against
its directors for losses the bank sustained during their tenure. 2 The
directors were generally inexperienced in banking, with the bank's
treasurer being the only experienced officer. The president had little
banking experience but was well regarded in the community and
owned a substantial portion of the bank's stock.33
The state Banking Commissioner conducted four audits of the
bank's books and reported to the directors, making severe criticisms
in each report." The Commissioner's reports indicated sloppy prac-
tices were common, pointed out problem loans and made other
criticisms of the operation of the bank.35 The officers responded
to the reports by assuring the directors that the needed corrections
had been made, but the directors did not confirm this for
themselves.36
2. Grunewald & Golden, Bank Director Liability Post-FIRA: How to Avoid It, 98
BANKING L.J. 412, 414 (1981). See Newman, Reducing the Risk of Bank Director Liabil-
ity, 96 BANKING L.J. 418, 429-31 (1979). Cf. First State Bank v. United States, 599 F.2d
558 (3d Cir. 1979); W. SCHiUCHiNG, T. RICE & J. COOPER, BANKING LAW §§ 6.02, 6.04-.05
(1982) [hereinafter cited as BANKING LAW].
29 See Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F. at 1013 ("It is incumbent upon bank directors in
the exercise of ordinary prudence, and as a part of their duty of general supervision, to
cause an examination of the condition and resources of the bank to be made with reasonable
frequency."). See also Newman, supra note 28, at 430.
,o See First State Bank v. United States, 599 F.2d at 562.
3' 171 N.E. at 42.
32 Id. at 44.
" Id. at 46.
I' Id. at 48. The directors had requested the audits. Id. at 47.
Id. at 48.
36 Id.
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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the direc-
tors were chargeable with knowledge of the bank's true condition
after the Commissioner's second report showed continuing prob-
lems with the bank's operations. They were thus negligent in not
replacing management or making other independent investigations
after receiving the Commissioner's second report." The court also
found the directors negligent for allowing excessive loans when the
bank's capital was impaired and then paying dividends. 8 As a
result of their negligence, the directors were held liable for the
dividends which were paid after capital was impaired, for losses
on loans in excess of the permitted percentage of capital, for per-
mitting overdrafts, for losses incurred on improvident loans, and
for losses on loans made which might have been collected or
reduced in size by the exercise of reasonable business judgment in
handling and disposing of collateral."' In so deciding, the court
stated:
Directors are bound to exercise ordinary prudence and skill to
care for and invest the money entrusted to the bank, in accord-
ance with its charter and the governing statutes. They must be
animated by the utmost good faith. They hold themselves out
as having the superintendance and management of all the con-
cerns of the bank. They thereby engage to conduct its business
as men of reasonable ability, necessary intelligence and sound
judgment ought to conduct it. They must be diligent in ascer-
taining and in keeping informed as to the condition of its affairs;
they must to a reasonable extent control and supervise its ex-
ecutive officers and agents; they must display understanding and
insight proportionate to the particular circumstances under which
they act. They need not exhibit greater wisdom and foresight than
may be fairly expected of the ordinary man in similar conditions.
They invite the confidence of the depositing public and must af-
ford the protection thereby implied. They are not bound to give
continuous attention to the business of the bank; they are bound
only to be present, so far as rationally practicable, at stated
meetings of the board and of its committees. They are not re-
, Id. at 50.
" Id. at 52. It should be noted that the directors were found negligent for paying
dividends even though the Banking Commissioner had authorized payment.
39 Id.
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quired to be expert accountants or familiar with the details of
bookkeeping or to know everything disclosed by the books of
the bank. Having regard to the nature and extent of the affairs
of the bank and the customs of banking, directors are justified
in commiting the conduct of the main business to officers and
subordinates and, in the absence of grounds for distrust, to
assume that such persons will be upright in the performance of
their duties. They are entitled to rely upon the information and
advice given them by executive officers whose probity and com-
petence are not under just suspicion, but they cannot surrender
to them the responsibilities resting on directors.... They must
do something to see that statutes established for the protection
of depositors are observed and followed.'
II. THE DInECTORS' ROLE iN BANK MANAGEMENT
A. Management Selection
The initial function of the board of directors is the selection
of competent, experienced and trustworthy management to oversee
the day-to-day operations and performance of the bank." Absent
serious problems requiring extraordinary effort and remedial at-
tention to the bank's affairs,' 2 the courts have held that directors
are not required to devote all of their time to the operation and
supervision of the bank. They may delegate day-to-day operational
and supervisory duties to properly chosen officers and other
employees.' 3 Such officers and employees should be competent and
40 Id. at 44-45.
4 Newman, supra note 28, at 431.
" See Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F. 1010 (W.D. Ark. 1907) (bank directors held to a
higher standard of care after events occurred which should have aroused suspicion). See
also Ford v. Taylor, 4 S.W.2d 938 (Ark. 1928); Kavanaugh v. Gould, 119 N.E. 237 (N.Y.
1918). Cf. Scott's Ex'rs v. Young, 21 S.W.2d 994, 997-98 (Ky. 1919) (directors held not
negligent in failing to discover defalcations of a cashier with a trustworthy reputation when
hired, and who did not change his modest lifestyle or otherwise create any circumstances
which would have put directors on notice of his embezzlement).
41 See, e.g., Wallace v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 15 S.W. 448, 454 (Tenn. 1891) ("Bank
directors are not expected to give their whole time and attention to the business of the com-
"pany. The customary method in regard to such associations is that the active management
and responsible custody is left to the cashier and other agents selected by the directors for
that purpose."). See also Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 164-65 (1891) (an ill director
held able to devote less attention to the bank than healthy directors without becoming
negligent in his duty). Cf. First State Bank v. Morton, 142 S.W. 694, 697-98 (Ky. 1912)
[Vol. 72
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of sufficient integrity that the directors may reasonably entrust
them with the bank's daily operations and control over banks
assets." Directors are not insurers, 4 however, and are bound on-
ly to use that care which ordinarily prudent and diligent men would
exercise under similar circumstances." The directors may rely upon
reports and information provided by management until such time
as circumstances exist which provide reason to doubt the reliability
of the employees.47
A careful, thoughtful evaluation of potential bank officers and,
in particular, the chief executive is extremely important."1 Manage-
ment should have integrity and experience in bank management
as well as any additional qualifications which the directors find are
necessary or appropriate to ensure competent management and
supervision of the bank. However, the job of providing for bank
management does not stop simply with the selection of well-
qualified individuals; the directors must also monitor and review
management's performance. 9
(president/shareholder who received no salary and was only a figurehead, with someone
else acting as the executive officer, was likened to a non-compensated director who is not
required to devote his entire time to the business). But see Bank of Des Arc v. Moody,
161 S.W. 134, 135 (Ark. 1913) (directors held personally liable to bank stockholders for
losses resulting from the directors' failure to control the actions of the bank's cashier). But
c.f. Mobley v. Faulk, 156 S.E. 40, 41 (Ga. 1930) ("The active management of the bank
may be delegated to certain officers authorized to manage its business. The directors,
however, must exercise a reasonable supervision over such officers.").
" Grunewald & Golden, supra note 28, at 415 ("directors should seek to retain in-
dividuals who have an in-depth knowledge of banking practices and possess reputations
for the highest degree of personal and financial integrity"). See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141
U.S. at 136.
" Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F. at 1013.
" Anderson v. Akers, 7 F. Supp. 924, 928 (W.D. Ky. 1934).
41 See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. at 148-49; Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F. at 1013,
1015; Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 171 N.E. 42, 50-51 (Mass. 1930).
11 Cf. FDIC v. Boone, 361 F. Supp. 133, 146-64 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (directors who
had justifiable confidence in the integrity and ability of the bank president were not liable
for losses despite his subsequent fraud).
41 Grunewald & Golden, supra note 28, at 414. See Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d
409 (2d Cir. 1943). The court in Michelsen stated:
[A] director conscientiously carrying out the duties of his office cannot be
held for statutory violations of which he neither has nor should have
knowledge. There the statute is the only measure of responsibility. But where
he has substantially abdicated the responsibilities of his office, then the
common-law principle-which is in addition to the statutory rules-operates
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
B. Monitoring Management's Performance
The board of directors must know the functions and respon-
sibilities of management, and make sure the selected officers per-
form their tasks properly.50 Directors are not relieved of their
responsibility to monitor management even though voting control
of the bank rests in the hands of the management team rather than
with the directors." Directors must also establish policies and pro-
cedures to prudently guide management in the bank's operations. 2
Due to the board's continuing responsibility to supervise manage-
ment, and because it may rely on management's operation of the
bank only when such reliance is reasonable,5" it is imperative that
the directors be familiar with the major areas of bank operations
and establish guidelines within which management may prudently
and effectively exercise its functions.
III. MONITORING THE BANK'S FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
A. Monitoring Sources of Risk
The business of a bank is to accept deposits from others and
to make such funds, together with its stockholders' capital,
available to others at a fee, either as loans or through permitted
investments. 4 Major sources of risk such as deposits, investments
and loans, should be governed by reasonable policies. A bank's
to make him liable for losses improperly incurred by his co-officers to whom
he has abandoned the operation of the bank.
Id. at 419.
See also Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 196 S.W. 803, 809-11 (Ark. 1917) (direc-
tors must give proper supervision to officers); Cunningham v. Shellman, 175 S.W. 1045,
1050 (Ky. 1915) (selection of competent management does not excuse directors from a con-
tinuing duty of ordinary care); Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 197 N.E. 649, 655 (direc-
tors are entitled to rely on trustworthy officers but cannot surrender responsibilities).
30 See Grunewald & Golden, supra note 28, at 414; Newman, supra note 28, at 429-31.
" A number of the cases involving a failure of the directors to monitor management
were situations where management owned a substantial, if not controlling, block of stock.
See, e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. at 157.
32 See First State Bank v. United States, 599 F.2d 558, 564 (3d Cir. 1979); BANKING
LAW, supra note 28, at § 6.04; Newman, supra note 28, at 429-31.
11 See, e.g., Ringeon v. Albinson, 35 F.2d 753 (D. Minn. 1929); Medford Trust Co.
v. McKnight, 197 N.E. 649 (Mass. 1935); Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 171 N.E. at 42.
14 See P. HORVITZ, MONETARY POLICY & THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 32 (4th ed.).
[Vol. 72
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profits and losses are dictated by the spread between its cost of
money, in the form of deposits, and its income from using such
resources, in the form of investments and loans. Errors which af-
fect the cost of money can generate losses as quickly as errors in
investment or loan decisions.
1. Deposits
The regulatory agencies are concerned with a bank's liquidity,
or the ratio of loans to deposits." An acceptable liquidity ratio is
difficult to maintain if a bank's deposit base56 is subject to sud-
den and extreme fluctuations, while its loan portfolio remains
stable. The FDIC has recognized the dangers in brokered deposits"
and, with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, has indicated that
all insured banks are currently required to report the amount of
brokered funds as part of the bank's quarterly Report of
Condition." The board of directors should establish policy
guidelines for setting deposit rates, terms and ratios to total assets,
bank capital and total loans so that the bank may maintain liquid-
ity, profitability and safety.
2. Investments
In addition to deposits, another major source of risk rests in
a bank's investment portfolio. Investment losses reduce profits,
capital and deposits. The board of directors must ensure that in-
" 12 U.S.C. § 82; KRS § 287.300.
" A bank's deposit stability rests in its core deposits-those likely to remain with
the bank indefinitely. Other deposits may represent investment funds, usually in the form
of large certificates of deposit, seeking high yields but which may not be relied upon by
the bank. Such funds may have been bought by the bank from the depositors or intermediary
brokers and often prove unreliable, moving quickly from one institution to another seek-
ing better rates. Brokered deposits should not be relied upon by a bank in making loans
for terms longer than those represented by the certificates of deposit.
,1 A brokered deposit is obtained through a broker who solicits his customers to make
insured deposits in their own or in the broker's name or to buy participations in an in-
sured certificate of deposit. Brokers also operate clearinghouses where investors can ob-
tain information about deposits in various institutions. The FDIC is afraid that these prac-
tices enable virtually any institution to attract large volumes of insured deposits regardless
of the institution's financial and managerial strength. See FDIC Press Release 86-83, [Current
Vol.] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 99,765 (Oct. 24, 1983).
52 Id.
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vestments are carefully chosen as to their rates and safety,5"
monitored for diversity, and matched with the bank's deposit base
as to the rates and term. Daily investment decisions can be
delegated to reliable employees, but the investment policy of the
bank and its methods of monitoring compliance are proper con-
cerns for the board of directors.
3. Loans
While both deposits and investments are major sources of risk
for a bank, no area of the bank's operation is more fraught with
risk than its lending activities. Nonetheless, making loans of bank
deposits and capital is the business of a bank. In determining bank
directors' negligence, courts are too often concerned with loan
losses and institutional insolvency from uncollected loans.60
However, because of the risk, all facets of the bank's loan activ-
ity, including the identity, integrity and financial resources of the
borrower, the use to which the funds will be put, the security and
the cash flow for the repayment, the rate being charged and the
time period for which the funds are committed, are the proper sub-
ject of board oversight and policymaking. 6 The directors must be
aware of the percentage of the bank's capital and surplus commit-
ted to its total loan portfolio as well as that percentage which may
be subject to a single risk.62 The possible effect on the liquidity
of the bank's current loans and its loans in default, is a proper
concern of the board. Improper attention to the loan portfolio may
constitute negligence resulting in personal liability to the director.63
Because of the loan portfolio's impact on the stability of a
, See Haynes v. Pierce, 6 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Okla. 1934) (directors held not liable
for purchasing illegal municipal bonds where they could not know of the illegality).
6 See, e.g., Holman v. Cross, 75 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1935).
6 Cf. Scott's Ex'rs v. Young, 21 S.W.2d 994, 999 (Ky. 1929) (bank directors who
exercise "reasonable care and diligence in looking after the affairs of the bank" are not
personally liable for loans exceeding the loan limit when the bank incurs no loss).
62 For the maximum percentage to be allowed to a single risk in Kentucky, see KRS
§ 287.280 (1981).
61 See generally Wallace v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 15 S.W. 448, 453 (Tenn. 1891) ("if
[directors] turn over the management of the [bank] to the exclusive control of other agents,
thus abdicating their control, then they are-guilty of gross neglect" and may be liable for
any losses resulting to the bank).
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bank, all banks are now subject to statutory lending limits which
are enforced by the applicable regulatory authorities." ' Some of
these restrictions apply only to extensions of credit to insiders or
affiliates.65 Other restrictions, such as those found in various state
statutes, applicable to state chartered banks,"' and those found in
the National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA), 67 applicable to all nationally
chartered banks, place an overall limit on a bank's lending to an
individual borrower.
The NBA restricts national banks from lending to any person,
co-partnership, association or corporation more than fifteen per-
cent of the aggregate of the bank's unimpaired capital stock and
surplus, subject to certain statutory exemptions.6" Section 93 of the
NBA imposes personal liability on directors who knowingly violate,
or permit a bank officer or agent, to violate any provision of that
Act. 69 Under section 93, a director's liability is predicated on par-
ticipation and knowledge. Therefore, loans made without the par-
ticipation or knowledge of a director will not result in personal
liability,7 provided the director has not grossly ignored his duty
to investigate.72
6 See, e.g., KRS § 287.280. A bank's primary regulator is the source of the regulatory
framework surrounding its activities. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
is the primary regulator of national banks, while the state department of banking is the
primary regulator of state chartered banks. However, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (FED) also regulates banks which are members of its system (including all
national banks), and state nonmember banks are regulated by the FDIC. For a discussion
of the state and federal bank regulatory framework, see Scott, The Patchwork Quilt: State
and Federal Roles in Bank Regulation, 32 STA. L. REv. 687 (1980).
" See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 84, 375(a)-(b) (1982); KRS § 287.280(2).
66 See, e.g., KRS § 287.280.
6, 12 U.S.C. § 84.
68 See id. See 12 C.F.R. § 32 (1983) for interpretive rulings of this section.
6, 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1982) provides:
If the directors of any national banking association shall knowingly violate,
or knowingly permit any of the officers, agents, or servants of the associa-
tion to violate any of the provisions of this Title... every director who par-
ticipated in or assented to the same shall be held liable in his personal and
individual capacity for all damages which the association, its shareholders,
or any other person, shall have sustained in consequence of such violation.
70 See id.
7, See Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 83-84 (1919) (director who
knowingly participated in an excessive loan held liable); Holman v. Cross, 75 F.2d at 912
(director is not liable for excessive loan about which he had no knowledge).
71 See Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 171 N.E. 42 (Mass. 1930).
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Moreover, since a violation of section 84 of the NBA occurs
when the total debt exceeds the applicable loan limit, 7" the amount
of liability may vary depending upon the facts. Where there are
multiple loans, only those disbursements by the bank after the total
debt reaches the lending limit (the difference between the greatest
amount of the debtor's obligation and the amount outstanding
prior to the violation), constitute the loss. In First National Bank
v. Keller," a series of transactions occurred resulting in an ag-
gregate loan to a corporation in excess of the bank's lending limit. 7
Prior to the loan, which made the aggregate debt exceed the limit
of $167,584.20, the corporation owed $156,578.33. After the trans-
action it owed $219,733.77. The court held the directors liable for
the difference between the $219,733.77 and $156,578.33, not the
$167,584.20 which was the legal lending limit." On the other hand,
where a single transaction exceeds the applicable lending limit, the
total amount of the loan is recoverable. 77 In addition to recovery
of the loan, liability under section 93 of the NBA can also include
damages suffered by the bank, its shareholders or other persons. 8
Because neither the Federal Reserve Act (FRA)79 nor the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act8" impose similar limits on normal borrow-
ings, state chartered banks are governed only by the restrictions
of their respective state statutes. Restrictions applicable to Kentucky
chartered banks are found in KRS section 287.280. This section
prohibits a bank or trust company from lending more than twenty
percent of its paid-in capital stock and surplus to any person, unless
the loan is collateralized or a mortgage in excess of the cash value
of the indebtedness is given.81 Regardless of whether the loan is
"3 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1).
" 318 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
, Id. at 344.
76 Id. at 347.
"7 See Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. at 68, where the Court held that
two simultaneous loans could be aggregated and treated as a single transaction which ex-
ceeded the applicable lending limit. Id. at 80-82.
78 See 12 U.S.C. § 93(a). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Hubbard, 240 S.W. 854 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1922); City Nat'l Bank v. Crow, 111 P. 210 (Okla. 1910). There is also a concur-
rent common law liability for making loans negligently. See Payne v. Ostrus, 50 F.2d 1039,
1044 (8th Cir. 1931).
7' 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (1982).
'0 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982).
" KRS § 287.280(1). For purposes of determining whether a bank has exceeded its
[Vol. 72
1983-841 LIABILITY OF BANK DIRECTORS
collateralized or a mortgage is given, indebtedness of any person
to the bank may not exceed thirty percent of the bank's paid-in
capital stock and surplus.8 2
Directors of Kentucky chartered banks which violate or ac-
quiesce in the violation of lending limits can be held individually
liable.83 At least one court has recognized that these limits were
designed for the protection of the bank, its creditors (including
depositors) and shareholders, all of whom may sue directors to
recover in appropriate circumstances.14
In order to properly discharge their duties as directors and to
avoid liability to shareholders, directors must also be aware of ad-
lending limit, the liability of individual members of a partnership is included in the aggregate
indebtedness of the partnership, and any credit extended "for the benefit of a person, part-
nership or association shall be included in the total [indebtedness] of the person, partner-
ship or association." Id.
82 KRS § 287.280(3). "Capital stock" is defined at KRS § 287.010(i) (Cum. Supp.
1982) as the sum of:
1. The par value of all shares of the corporation having a par value that have
been issued; 2. The amount of the consideration received by the corporation
for all shares of the corporation that have been issued without par value ex-
cept such part of the consideration as has been allocated to surplus in a manner
permitted by law; and 3. Such amounts not included in paragraphs 1 and 2
of this subsection as have been transferred to stated capital of the corpora-
tion, whether through the issuance of stock dividends, resolution of the bank's
board of directors under applicable corporate law or otherwise by law.
"Surplus" is defined at KRS § 287.0100) (Cum. Supp. 1982) as "the amount of con-
sideration received by the corporation for all shares issued without par value that has not
been allocated to capital stock or the amount of consideration received by the corporation
in excess of par value for all shares with a par value or both." Note that undivided profits
and earned surplus are excluded from "paid-in capital stock and surplus."
11 KRS § 287.990(5) states: "Any directors of a bank who knowingly violate, or know-
ingly permit any officer or employe of the bank to violate, any of the laws relating to banks,
shall be jointly and severally liable to the creditors and stockholders for any loss or damage
resulting from such violation." See Cunningham v. Shellman, 175 S.W. 1045, 1051 (Ky.
1915) (negligent directors held liable to depositors for losses); Wickliffe v. Turner, 157 S.W.
1125, 1127 (Ky. 1913) (directors held liable for exceeding statutory lending limits). See also
Scott's Ex'rs v. Young, 21 S.W.2d at 998 (directors were not personally liable since they
exercised reasonable care in the management of the bank).
"4 See Cunningham v. Shellman, 175 S.W. at 1051. In this case, the directors who
were found to be grossly negligent in the management of the bank were held liable for the
loss occasioned by loans made in excess of the statutory limit. Id. Directors who presumably
have exercised due care but have knowingly permitted the 30vo limit to be violated may
be liable for the amount of the loan which exceeds the limit. In addition, failure to ade-
quately secure a loan which exceeds the 200o limit may subject directors to liability for the
entire loan. See Wickliffe v. Turner, 157 S.W. at 1127 (single stockholder had a cause of
action for such a violation).
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ditional restrictions contained in various federal and state statutes.
The most significant federal legislation affecting transactions by
bank directors and other insiders is the Financial Institutions
Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 (FIRA)." s Most
of FIRA's provisions apply to all federally insured banks including
national banks, state chartered banks which are members of the
Federal Reserve System and state chartered nonmember banks in-
sured by the FDIC. 86 Thus, its provisions affect almost every bank
and bank director.8 7
B. Monitoring the Payment of Dividends
Declaring dividends on the bank's stock is a board function 8
which affects all shareholders and, to the extent it removes
resources from the bank, also affects the bank's solvency.
Therefore, in some circumstances, payment of dividends can result
in personal liability to the director. Paying dividends when capital
is, or may be, impaired has been found to be negligent conduct
on the part of the directors, giving rise to personal liability.8 9 The
National Banking Act (NBA) provides for dividends to be declared
quarterly, semiannually or annually, at the discretion of the board
of directors, and limits the amount of the dividend to the bank's
" Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641-3671 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
This legislation was adopted in the wake of much publicity regarding alleged insider abuses
of banking institutions. Perhaps the most notorious of these reports concerned the former
director of the Federal Office-of Management and Budget, Bert Lance. See Guenter, The
Lance Legacy-Title VIII of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Con-
trol Act of 1978, 96 BANKING L.J. 292 (1979).
"6 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1972(2), 1841(c).
" For an overview, discussion and analysis of the impact of FIRA on banking, see
Grunewald & Golden, supra note 28; Geunter, supra note 85. For a detailed explanation
of FIRA as it relates to correspondents and insider loans see Note, Correspondent Bank-
ing and Insider Loans After the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Con-
trol Act of 1978, 37 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 1327 (1980).
" See 12 U.S.C. § 60(a) (1982); KRS § 287.350(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
" See, e.g., Cunningham v. Shellman, 175 S.W. at 1050-51 (the negligent declara-
tion of unlawful dividends when bank was insolvent resulted in the directors being liable
for the full amount of losses to depositors regardless of the amount of the dividend). But
see Scott's Ex'rs v. Young, 21 S.W.2d at 999 (directors were not personally liable since
they exercised reasonable care in bank management); Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 197
N.E. 649, 669 (Mass. 1935) (directors who relied on the advice of investment committee
in deciding to declare a dividend were not negligent in declaring a dividend in excess of
the earnings available and thus were not personally liable).
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net profits.9 0 Other NBA requirements include: (1) the payment of
dividends cannot result in impairment of the bank's capital; 91 (2)
at the time of payment the bank must not be in default on any
payment of any assessment due to the FDIC; 92 and (3) at the time
of payment any cumulative dividends on outstanding preferred
stock must be fully paid.93 In addition, until its capital surplus is
equal to its capital stock account, prior to declaring a quarterly
or semiannual dividend, the bank must add to its surplus at least
ten percent of its net profit for the preceding half year, or, in the
case of annual dividends, for the preceding two consecutive half
years.9 ' Regulatory approval is required to declare dividends which
exceed a bank's current net profit.95
For Kentucky banks, KRS section 287.350 restricts dividends
to that portion of the bank's net profit which the board of direc-
tors deems to be proper. 9 Both the Kentucky statute and the NBA
require that, before a dividend can be declared, at least ten per-
cent of the bank's net profits for the period covered by the divi-
dend must be carried to its surplus account until the surplus equals
the common capital stock account. 97 Approval of the Commis-
sioner of Banking is required for dividends in excess of the ag-
gregate of the bank's net profits for the year in which the dividend
is declared plus retained net profits from the preceding two years. 98
Payment of illegal dividends by a board of directors may result
in personal liability to the directors, and this liability may exceed
the amount of the dividend paid.99
See 12 U.S.C. § 60(a).
" 12 U.S.C. § 56 (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 7.6100 (1983).
92 12 U.S.C. § 1828(b) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 7.6100(c).
12 U.S.C. § 51b(b) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 7.6100(c).
" 12 U.S.C. § 60(a). In this context "surplus" means paid-in or capital surplus, rather
than earned surplus (sometimes referred to as undivided profits). 12 U.S.C. § 51.
" 12 U.S.C. § 60(b); 12 C.F.R. § 7.6100(b).
" See KRS § 287.350(1).
" See 12 U.S.C. § 60; KRS § 287.350(2).
KRS § 287.350(4).
" See Roberts v. Hargis, 96 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Ky. 1936) (where directors pay dividends
on an insolvent bank or dividends which render the bank insolvent, the commissioner of
banking may recover the amount of the dividends from the directors, and the bank's
depositors can also recover from the directors the amount of their loss); Cunningham v.
Sheiman, 175 S.W. at 1051 (directors of an insolvent bank were grossly negligent in declaring
dividends and were liable for full amount of debts due the depositors).
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C. Monitoring Management Interlocks
Directors owe a duty of loyalty to the bank on whose board
they serve.' 0 This duty requires fairness and caution on the part
of directors who serve on the boards of two banks."0 ' The
Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act (Interlocks Act)
now prohibits management officials' 2 of one depository institu-
tion from serving as management officials of certain other
depository institutions.' 3
Depository institutions affected by the above restrictions in-
clude banks, savings and loans and credit unions.' °" In order to
foster competition, management officials of a depository institu-
tion or depository holding company are prohibited from serving
in a similar capacity with another institution or holding company
if the two organizations "(1) are not affiliated"'0 5 and "(2) are very
,oo See Globe Nat'l Bank v. McLean, 269 P. 9, 11 (Colo. 1928).
101 See id. ("His relation to both banks and their depositors was one of trust, in the
discharge of which he is held to the utmost good faith.").
102 "Management official" is defined in 12 U.S.C. § 3201(4) (1982) as "an employee
or officer with management functions, a director (including an advisory or honorary direc-
tor), a trustee of a business organization under the control of trustees, or any person who
has a representative or nominee serving in any such capacity. . . ." The term "manage-
ment official" specifically excludes: (1) one whose management functions relate exclusively
to retail merchandising or manufacturing; (2) one whose management functions relate prin-
cipally to the business outside the United States of a foreign commercial bank; or (3) other
persons specifically excluded from § 202(4) of the statute. Id. See 12 C.F.R. § 26.2(h) (1983)
(applicable to national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 212.2(h) (1982) (applicable to state member
banks); 12 C.F.R. § 348.2(h) (1983) (applicable to state insured nonmember banks).
1.3 12 U.S.C. §§ 3202, 3203 (1982).
104 12 U.S.C. § 3201(1).
,o5 12 C.F.R. § 348.1. Interlocking relationships between affiliates are not prohibited
by the statute. Institutions are affiliates if: (1) one of the institutions is a subsidiary of the
other which is a depository holding company or if both institutions are subsidiaries of the
same holding company, incorporating the definition of subsidiary contained in 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(d) or 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(a)(1)(H) (1982); (2) the same persons beneficially own more
than 50%Io of the voting stock of each of two institutions; (3) one institution is a mutual
savings bank, and all the stock of the other institution which is a trust company is owned
by one or more mutual savings banks; or (4) one of the institutions is an insured state bank
whose voting securities are held by other banks or officers of other banks and the bank
primarily provides services for other banks and not for the public. 12 U.S.C. § 3201(3).
Shares belonging to an individual's spouse, parent, child, grandchild, sibling or sibling's
spouse are included as shares of the individual, whether or not any of their shares are held
in trust. 12 C.F.R. §§ 26.2(b), 212.2(b), 348.2(b). The federal supervisory agency may deter-
mine that an asserted affiliation was created to avoid the Interlocks Act prohibitions. If
this determination is made, there is no real commonality of interest, and therefore, there
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large or are located in the same local area.' ' 6
Thus, in general, the Interlocks Act's prohibitions apply to
depository institutions" 7 or depository institution holding
companies"0 8 if: (1) one entity has total assets in excess of one
billion dollars and the other has total assets in excess of $500
million; 0 9 (2) either entity has total assets greater than twenty
million dollars and they or their affiliates have offices in the same
standard metropolitan statistical area; or (3) neither entity has total
assets of more than twenty million dollars and they or any affiliates
have offices in the same or any contiguous or adjacent city, town
or village.' 0
is no affiliate relationship based on common ownership. In making this determination, the
agencies will consider, among other things, whether a person, together with members of
his or her immediate family whose shares are necessary to constitute the group, owns a
minimal percentage of the shares of one of the organizations which is substantially dispropor-
tionate to the percentage of shares owned in the other organization. 12 C.F.R. § 26.2(b)
(applicable to management officials of national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 212.2(b) (applicable
to state member banks); 12 C.F.R. § 348.2(b) (applicable to management officials of state
insured nonmember banks).
106 12 C.F.R. § 348.1(b).
107 12 U.S.C. § 3201(1) provides: "[T]he term 'depository institution' means a com-
mercial bank, a savings bank, a trust company, a savings and loan association, a building
and loan association, a homestead association, a cooperative bank, an industrial bank, or
a credit union .. " The term also includes a United States office of a foreign commer-
cial bank. See 12 C.F.R. § 26.2(0 (applicable to national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 212.2(0 (ap-
plicable to state member banks); 12 C.F.R. § 348.2(f) (applicable to state insured nonmember
banks).
,0, 12 U.S.C. § 3201(2) (1982) provides:
[T]he term "depository holding company" means a bank holding company
as defined in Section 2(a) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 [12
U.S.C. § 1841(a)], a company which would be a bank holding company as
defined in Section 2(a) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 ... but
for the exemption contained in Section 2(a)(5)(F) . . . thereof, or a savings
and loan holding company as defined in Section 408(a)(1)(D) of the National
Housing Act [12 U.S.C.§ 1730a(a)(1)(D)].
109 12 U.S.C. § 3203 (1982). Note that total assets are "measured on a consolidated
basis as of the close of the organization's latest fiscal year." 12 C.F.R. § 26.2(1) (applicable
to national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 212.2(1) (applicable to state member banks); 12 C.F.R.
§ 348.2(1) (applicable to state insured nonmember banks).
"0 12 U.S.C. §§ 3202-3203. "Office" means a principal or branch office of the
depository institution located in the United States, "but does not include a representative
office of a foreign commercial bank, an electronic terminal, or a loan production office."
12 C.F.R. § 26.2(i) (applicable to national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 212.2(i) (applicable to state
member banks); 12 C.F.R. § 348.2(i) (applicable to state insured nonmember banks). "Ad-
jacent cities, towns or villages means cities, towns or villages whose borders are within ten
road miles of each other at their closest points." 12 C.F.R. § 26.2(a) (applicable to na-
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D. Monitoring Insider Transactions
Banking transactions that involve insiders have been the sub-
ject of recent legislation which attempts to curb insider abuses."'
According to a congressional report:
Self-dealing is involved in almost all serious problem bank situa-
tions. It is generally found in form of an over extension of credit
on an unsound basis to large share owners, or their interests, who
have improperly used their positions as owners to take money
from the bank in the form of unjustified loans (or sometimes as
fees, salaries, or payments for goods or service). Active oficers
who hold their positions at the pleasure of the board and share
owners are subject to influence and therefore are not usually in
a position to evaluate and reject these credits on the same basis
as the credit requests of other bank customers. In a situation of
this nature, active management will often vigorously defend the.
unsound loans or other self-dealing practices perpetrated upon
the bank by the owners." 2
tional banks); 12 C.F.R. § 212.2(a) (applicable to state member banks); 12 C.F.R. § 348.2(a)
(applicable to state insured nonmember banks). Specifically exempted by the terms of 12
U.S.C. § 3204 are:
(1) A depository institution or depository holding company which has been
placed formally in liquidation, or which is in the hands of receiver, conser-
vator or other official exercising a similar function; (2) A corporation
operating under Section 25 or 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act ["Edge cor-
porations"]; (3) A credit union being served by a management official of
another credit union; (4) A depository institution or depository holding com-
pany which does not do business within any state of the United States...
except as an incident to its activities outside the United States; (5) A state-
chartered savings and loan guaranty corporation; or (6) Federal Home Loan
Bank or any other bank organized specifically to serve depository institutions.
12 U.S.C. § 3204 (1982).
Other interlocking relationships may be permitted by the Comptroller if: (1) one of
the organizations is located in a low income or other economically depressed area or is con-
trolled or managed by persons who are members of minority groups or by women; (2) one
of the organizations is a newly chartered organization; (3) one of the organizations faces
conditions endangering the organization's safety or soundness; (4) one of the organizations
is a federally insured credit union that is sponsored by the other depository organization
or its affiliate primarily to serve employees of that depository organization; or (5) if an
organization is likely to lose 50 percent or more of its directors or of its total management
officials due to a change in circumstances. 12 C.F.R. § 26.4(b) (applicable to national banks);
12 C.F.R. § 212.4(b) (applicable to state member banks); 12 C.F.R. § 348.4(b) (applicable
to state insured nonmember banks).
' See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 375a-375b (1982).
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978). For a general discussion of
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Principal sections of FIRA"3 restricting insider loans are found
in sections 22(g) and 22(h) of the Federal Reserve Act' 4 which ap-
plies to national banks and state member banks. Federally insured
nonmember banks are also subject to section 22(h). I I The Comp-
troller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and the FDIC have all adopted regulations regard-
ing insider loans." 6 Section 22(h) contains four general rules. First,
the statute sets maximum limits on loans to executive officers, "1 7
principal shareholdersIII and their related interests ' 9 equal to the
the restrictions of FIRA on insider loans, see Note, Insider Loans: How Restricted is the
Banker?, 9 FoRDAM URB. L.J. 431 (1980-81).
'" See note 85 supra.
11 12 U.S.C. §§ 375a-375b.
I" While the statute refers to "member banks" it has been made applicable to federally
insured nonmember banks by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(j)(2)
(1982).
"' The Federal Reserve Board has adopted regulations interpreting both sections 22(g)
and 22(h) in Regulation 0. 12 C.F.R. § 215 (1982). The Comptroller has adopted, by
reference, the loan limits set forth in Regulation 0 as the loan limits for national banks.
47 Fed. Reg. 49,347 (1982) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 31.2). The FDIC has issued regula-
tions which make substantially all of Regulation 0, except those provisions interpreting
Section 22(g) (relating to restrictions on loans to executive officers), applicable to state in-
sured nonmember banks. 12 C.F.R. § 337.3(a)-(b) (1983) (as amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 42,969
(1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 337.3(b))).
'" An executive officer is defined as:
A person who participates or has authority to participate (other than in the
capacity of a director) in major policymaking functions of the company or
bank, whether or not: (1) The officer has an official title, (2) the title designates
the officer an assistant, or (3) the officer is serving without salary or other
compensation. The chairman of the board, the president, every vice presi-
dent, the cashier, the secretary, and the treasurer of a company or bank are
considered executive officers, unless (1) the officer is excluded, by resolution
of the board of directors or by the bylaws of the bank or company, from
participation.., in major policymaking functions of the bank or company,
and (2) the officer does not actually participate therein.
12 C.F.R. § 215.2(d) (1983).
"' For purposes of applying the maximum lending limit, the term "principal
shareholder" is defined differently when the bank is located in a low population density
area. If the bank is located in a city with a population of less than 30,000, a shareholder
must have the power to vote more than 18% of any class of voting securities of the bank
before being deemed a principal shareholder. In other instances, a principal shareholder
is one who holds more than 10% of any class of a bank's voting securities. 12 U.S.C. §
375(b)(I) (1982). Note that for purposes of the second and third general rules set forth in
the text, the separate definition for banks located in small towns or cities is not applicable.
See id.
"' A "related interest" means "(1) a company that is controlled by a person or (2)
a political or campaign committee that is controlled by a person or the funds or services
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limits on loans to a single borrower established by 12 U.S.C. §
84.120 Section 84 provides that total unsecured loans to any one
person shall not exceed fifteen percent of the aggregate unimpaired
capital and surplus of the bank,'' plus an additional ten percent
of its aggregate unimpaired capital and surplus if the loan is secured
by readily marketable collateral having a market value at least equal
to the amount of the loan.1
2 2
Section 22(h) also requires that all loans to executive officers,
directors, principal shareholders'2 3 or related interests which ex-
ceed amounts established by regulation of the appropriate federal
of which will benefit a person." 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(k) (1982). A person "controls" a com-
pany if that person directly or indirectly, acting through or in concert with others,
(A) owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 percentum or more of any class
of voting securities of the company; (B) controls in any manner the election
of a majority of the directors of the company; or (C) has the power to exer-
cise a controlling influence over the management or policies of such company.
12 U.S.C. § 375b(5) (1982).
A person is presumed to have control, including the power to exercise a controlling influence
over the management or policies of a company or bank if:
(i) The person is (A) an executive officer or director of the company or bank
and (B) directly or indirectly owns, controls, or has the power to vote more
than 10 percent of any class of voting securities of the company or bank; or
(ii)(A) the person directly or indirectly owns, controls, or has the power to
vote more than 10 percent of any class of voting securities of the company
or bank, and (B) no other person owns, controls, or has the power to vote
a greater percentage of that class of voting securities.
12 C.F.R. § 215.2(b)(2). "An individual is not considered to have control.., of a com-
pany or bank solely by virtue of the individual's position as an officer or director of the
company or bank." 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(b)(3). A person who is presumed to have control
may rebut the presumption by submitting to the appropriate federal banking agency writ-
ten materials that demonstrate a lack of control. 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(b)(4).
,20 12 U.S.C. § 375b(1) (1982).
See 48 Fed. Reg. 42,805 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(0). A bank's
unimpaired capital and surplus equals the sum of:
(1) the "total equity capital" of the member bank reported on its most re-
cent consolidated report of condition . . . , (2) any subordinated notes and
debentures approved as an addition to the member bank's capital structure
by the appropriate Federal banking agency, and (3) any valuation reserves
created by charges to the member bank's income.
Id.
122 Id. The market value must be based upon "reliable and continuously available
market price quotations." Id.
2I The definition of principal shareholder, which triggers board approval and non-
preferential treatment under § 22(h), is one who holds more than 10% of any class of the
bank's voting securities. 12 C.F.R. § 215.20). The more liberal "small-town" definition
applies only to the lending limits of 12 U.S.C. § 375b(1).
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banking agency, be approved in advance by a majority of the board
of directors, with any interested party abstaining from participating
directly or indirectly in the voting. 24 The Federal Reserve Board,
Comptroller and FDIC have adopted regulations which set the
threshold for board approval at the aggregate, when considered
with all other loans to that person or to any related interest, of
more than $25,000, or five percent of the bank's capital and
surplus, whichever is higher. 1 25 Regardless of the size of the bank,
all loans to insiders which in the aggregate exceed $500,000 require
prior approval of the bank's board of directors.' 26
All insider loans must also be made on substantially the same
terms, including interest rates and collateral, as those prevailing
for comparable transactions and must not involve more than the
normal risk of repayment.'2 7 A bank also may not pay an over-
draft on the account at that bank of an executive officer or
director.'28
Section 22(g)'29 of the Federal Reserve Act prohibits member
banks from extending credit to executive officers' 30 unless the ex-
124 12 U.S.C. § 375b(2).
12, See 48 Fed. Reg. 42,804 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(b)) (Federal
Reserve Board); 48 Fed. Reg. 42,969 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 337.3(b)) (FDIC);
48 Fed. Reg. 44,062 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 31.2(b)) (Comptroller).
"1 48 Fed. Reg. 42,804 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(b)) (applicable to state
member banks); 48 Fed. Reg. 42,969 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 337.3(b)) (applicable
to state insured nonmember banks); 48 Fed. Reg. 44,062 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §
31.2(b)) (applicable to national banks).
227 12 U.S.C. § 375b(3).
12. 12 U.S.C. § 375b(4). For a detailed discussion of the prohibition against overdrafts,
see text accompanying notes 159-61 infra.
'9 12 U.S.C. § 375a.
,' For purposes of § 22(g), "an executive officer of a member bank does not include
an executive officer of a bank holding company of which the member bank is a subsidiary
or any other subsidiary of that bank holding company." 12 C.F.R. § 215.5(a) n.4. A bank
cannot extend credit to a partnership in which one or more of its executive officers are
partners with a majority interest, either individually or together, unless the aggregate loan
meets the limitations noted in the text accompanying notes 125-26 supra and note 133 in-
fra. 12 C.F.R. § 215.5(b). In determining the limitations on other loans, the full amount
of any credit extended to a partnership is deemed to have been extended to each executive
officer of the bank who is a member of the partnership. Id. Note also that loans to related
interests of executive officers (other than partnerships) are not subject to the restrictions
of § 22(g). However, such loans are covered by the lending limits and other requirements
of § 22(h). See 12 U.S.C. § 375b.
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tention of credit is a mortgage loan,' a loan to finance the educa-
tion of the executive officer's children,' 3 2 or a general extension
of credit which does not exceed the higher of $25,000 or 2.5 per-
cent of the bank's capital and unimpaired surplus, but in no event
more than $100,000.'13 Any extension of credit by a member bank
to any of its executive officers must be reported promptly to the
member bank's board of directors. The extension of credit must
be on substantially the same terms, including interest rates and col-
lateral, as those terms prevailing at the time for comparable trans-
actions by the bank with other persons, and must not involve more
than the normal risk of repayment or present other unfavorable
features.' 3 In addition, the extension of credit may be made only
after the executive officer has submitted a detailed current finan-
cial statement, and the credit extension must be contingent on a
stipulation that the bank has an option to make the extension due
and payable if the officer borrows from any other bank making
his total debt equal to either 2.5 percent of the bank's capital or
$25,000, whichever is greater. In any event, the total debt incur-
red may not exceed $100,000.15
A member bank must attach to its report of condition to the
FDIC a list of all extensions of credit made by the member bank
to its executive officers since the date of the bank's previous report
of condition.' 3 6 Also, after Dec. 31, 1983, each member bank and
each state insured nonmember bank must, upon written request
from the public, make available the names of its executive officers
and principal shareholders (and their related interests) to whom it
had credits outstanding of more than $25,000, if the aggregate
"' Mortgage loans may be made to an executive officer provided the loan is specifically
approved by the bank's board of directors prior to granting the loan, is "secured by a first
lien on a dwelling which is expected to be owned by the officer and to be used by him as
his residence," and "no other loan by the bank to the officer under the authority of [§
22(g)] is outstanding." 12 U.S.C. § 375a(2).
, 2 12 U.S.C. § 375a(3). See also 47 Fed. Reg. 49,347 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 215.5(c)(1)).
48 Fed. Reg. 42,804 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 215.5(c)(3)) (applicable
to state member banks); 48 Fed. Reg. 44,062 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 31.2(a))
(applicable to national banks).
1 12 C.F.R. § 215.9(d).
'13 Id.
.36 12 C.F.R. § 215.9 (1983).
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credit equaled or exceeded the lesser of five percent or more of the
bank's capital and surplus or $500,000.' 31
Further, section 22(d) of the FRA prohibits any member bank
from selling to or acquiring securities or other property from any
of its directors or their related interests unless the sale or purchase
is made in the regular course of business upon terms not less
favorable to the bank than those offered to others, or the sale or
purchase is authorized by a disinterested majority of the board of
directors.I38 Also, section 22(e) prohibits a member bank from pay-
ing preferential interest rates on deposits by directors and other
insiders.139
A civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each day a violation con-
tinues may be assessed against any director "participating in the
conduct of the affairs" of a bank which violates any provision of
section 22.14' In determining the amount of the penalty, the ap-
plicable banking authority considers the size of financial resources,
the good faith of the person charged, the gravity of the violation,
any previous violations and "such other matters as justice may
require."I 4
In addition, the FRA expressly provides for a private right of
action.142 A director "participating in or assenting to [a violation
of section 22] shall be held liable in his personal and individual
capacity for all damages which the member bank, its shareholders,
,3' 48 Fed. Reg. 56,934 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 215.10(b)) (applicable
to member banks); 48 Fed. Reg. 57,110 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 349.4(a)) (ap-
plicable to state insured nonmember banks). Member banks must maintain records of all
requests and their subsequent disposition. 48 Fed. Reg. 56,934 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 215.10(c)). State insured nonmember banks must maintain copies of the requests and record
the bank's disposition of them. 48 Fed. Reg. 57,110 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 349.4(c)).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 375.
-3' 12 U.S.C. § 376.
"' 12 U.S.C. § 504 (applicable to member banks); 12 U.S.C. § 18286)(3) (applicable
to state insured nonmember banks). Penalties assessed pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 504 and
12 U.S.C. § 18280)(3) require a lesser standard of culpability than the private right of ac-
tion created by 12 U.S.C. § 503. These sections require only that the director participate
in the conduct of the affairs of a bank which violates any provision of § 22. There is no
knowledge requirement. Grunewald & Golden, supra note 28, at 426.
" 12 U.S.C. § 504 (applicable to member banks), 12 U.S.C. § 18280)(3) (applicable
to state insured nonmember banks).
" See 12 U.S.C. § 503.
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or any other persons shall have sustained in consequence of such
violation."' 43
Kentucky banks are also restricted in extending credit to direc-
tors or officers.' 44 The applicable statute states:
No bank or trust company shall permit any of its directors or
officers to become indebted or obligated as guarantor or surety
to it in an amount exceeding 10%7 of its capital stock actually
paid in, without securing the excess by the mortgage or pledge
of real or personal property double in value the amount of the
excess.
45
Even if adequately collateralized, the total debt of a director or
officer to his bank may never exceed thirty percent of its paid-in
capital and surplus.' 46
E. Monitoring Transactions with Affiliates147
Section 23A of the FRA 14' governs certain financial transac-
tions between banks and their affiliates. 4 9 Section 23A prohibits
a bank from entering into certain transactions ' with affiliates'5
' Id. The statute requires that the director "knowingly violate or permit" the violation
of the provisions of § 22. See id.
See KRS § 287.280(2).
'4 Id. Note that the benchmark for maximum debt to directors and officers is IO0a
of capital stock actually paid in, and does not include the bank's surplus. Cf. KRS §
287.280(1), (3) (lending limitations are expressed in percentages of paid-in capital and ac-
tual surplus).
146 KRS § 287.280(3).
"I' For a detailed discussion of the statutory restrictions on transactions with affiliates
authored by staff members of the Federal Reserve Board, see Rose & Talley, Bank Trans-
actions with Affiliates: The New Section 23A, 100 BANKING L.J. 423 (1983).
"1 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1982).
141 Section 23A imposes limitations on member banks. Its provisions also apply to
insured nonmember banks under 12 U.S.C. § 18280)(1).
"I Covered transactions include:
(A) a loan or extension of credit to the affiliate; (B) a purchase of or an in-
vestment in securities issued by the affiliate; (C) a purchase of assets... from
an affiliate, [unless the assets are] specifically exempted by the Board by order
or regulation; (D) the acceptance of securities issued by the affiliate as col-
lateral security for a loan or extension of credit to any person or company;
or (E) the issuance of a guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit, including
an endorsement or stand by letter of credit, on behalf of an affiliate.
12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7).
"I The term "affiliate" includes: (1) the parent holding company of the bank and
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unless: (1) the transaction is an exempt transaction;' (2) the loan
is properly collateralized;'53 (3) the aggregate amount of the covered
any sister company controlled by the parent bank holding company; (2) any bank subsidiary
of the bank; (3) any company controlled by the same persons controlling the bank, or in
which a majority of its directors constitutes a majority of directors in the bank or any com-
pany that controls the bank; (4) any company "sponsored and advised on a contractual
basis" by the bank or any affiliate of the bank, or an investment company with respect
to which the bank or any affiliate is an investment advisor; and (5) any company which
is determined by the Federal Reserve Board to have a relationship with the member bank
or its subsidiary or affiliate so that a covered transaction between the bank and the com-
pany may be affected by the relationship, to the detriment of the bank. 12 U.S.C. §
371c(b)(1) (1982). Specifically excluded from the definition of an affiliate are:
(A) any company, other than a bank, that is a subsidiary of a member bank
... ; (B) any company engaged solely in holding the premises of a member
bank; (C) any company engaged solely in conducting a safe deposit business;
(D) any company engaged solely in holding obligations of the United States
or its agencies or obligations fully guaranteed by the United States or its agen-
cies as to principal and interest; and (E) any company where control results
from the exercise of rights arising out of a bona fide debt previously con-
tracted ...
12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(2).
"I The following transactions are specifically exempted from the provisions of sec-
tion 23A:
(1) any transaction, [other than the purchase of low quality assets (unless the
bank or affiliate, pursuant to an independent credit evaluation committed itself
to purchase the asset prior to the time the asset was purchased by the affiliate),
between 80% or more owned sister bank subsidiaries in a multi-bank holding
company organization]; (2) making deposits in an affiliated bank... in the
ordinary course of correspondent business ... ; (3) giving immediate credit
to an affiliate for uncollected items received in the ordinary course of business;
(4) making a loan or extension of credit to, or issuing a guarantee acceptance
or letter of credit on behalf of, an affiliate that is fully secured by-
(A) obligations of the United States or its agencies, (B) obligations fully
guaranteed by the United States or its agencies as to principal and in-
terest; or (C) a segregated, earmarked deposit account with the member
bank;
(5) purchasing securities issued by any company described in section [4(c)(1)
of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956]; (6) purchasing assets having
a readily identifiable and publicly available market quotation and purchased
at the market quotation ... ; or (7) purchasing from an affiliate a loan or
extension of credit that was initiated by the member bank and sold to the
affiliate subject to a repurchasing agreement or with recourse.
12 U.S.C. § 371c(d).
In addition, the Federal Reserve Board may issue regulations and orders to exempt
any other transaction or relationship if it is "in the public interest and consistent with the
purposes of this section." 12 U.S.C. § 371c(e).
' The collateral must have a market value at the time of the transaction equal to
100-130% of the amount of the loan, depending on the type of collateral. 12 U.S.C. §
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transactions to that affiliate does not exceed ten percent of the
capital and surplus of the bank;"" and (4) the aggregate of all
covered transactions to all affiliates does not exceed twenty per-
cent of the capital and surplus of the bank. 55 Section 23A also
prohibits a bank from acquiring a "low-quality asset" ' from an
affiliate unless, pursuant to an independent credit evaluation, the
acquiring bank commmitted to purchase the asset prior to the
asset's acquisition by the affiliate.'17 For each day a violation of
section 23A continues, the applicable federal regulatory agency can
assess a civil penalty of up to $1,000 per day against a director par-
ticipating in the affairs of the violating bank.'58
F. Monitoring Overdrafts
Under FIRA, a bank may not pay an overdraft on an executive
officer's or director's account,'59 unless it does so in accordance
with a written, pre-authorized interest bearing credit plan which
includes a repayment plan, or under a written, pre-authorized
transfer from another account of the same person at the bank.'60
371c(c)(1). Collateral which is subsequently retired or amortized must be replaced by ad-
ditional eligible collateral, where needed, to keep the collateral value equal to the minimum
percentage required for the remainder of the loan. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(c)(2). Low quality assets
and securities issued by affiliates of the bank are not acceptable collateral. 12 U.S.C. §
371c(c)(3)-(4).
12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1)(A).
12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1)(B).
A "low-quality asset" is defined as:
(A) as asset classified as "substandard," "doubtful," or "loss" or treated
as "other loans especially mentioned" in the most recent report of examina-
tion.., prepared by either a Federal or State supervisory agency; (B) an asset
in nonaccrual status; (C) an asset on which principal or interest payments are
more than thirty days past due; or (D) an asset whose terms have been
renegotiated or compromised due to the deteriorating financial condition of
the obligor.
12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(10).
See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(3).
"' 12 U.S.C. § 504 (applicable to member banks); 12 U.S.C. § 18280)(3) (applicable
to state insured nonmember banks).
,59 12 U.S.C. § 375(b)(4).
'" 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(d). A bank can also pay "inadvertent" overdrafts if the over-
draft being paid, together with any other overdrafts then outstanding, does not exceed
$1,000, the overdrafts are not outstanding for more than five business days, and the bank
charges the executive officer or director its regular fee for paying overdrafts. Id.
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The prohibition against paying overdrafts does not apply to one
who is only a principal shareholder, nor does it apply to related
interests of an executive officer, director or principal shareholder. 6'
G. Monitoring Transactions with Correspondent Banks
Under FIRA, banks with correspondent account relationships' 16 2
cannot extend credit to each other's insiders' 63 on preferential
terms. 6 In addition to the lending restrictions, a bank may not
establish a correspondent relationship with another bank if either
currently has preferential loans to the other's insiders. 65
On or before Jan. 31 of each year, executive officers and prin-
cipal shareholders'66 of every bank must provide a written report' 67
161 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(d) n.3.
162 Correspondent accounts are those maintained by one bank with another for the
deposit or placement of funds. 12 C.F.R. § 215.21(c) (1983). Specifically excluded from
the definition of a correspondent account are "(1) Time deposits at prevailing market rates,
and (2) An account maintained in the ordinary course of business solely for the purpose
of effecting federal funds transactions at prevailing market rates or making Eurodollar
placements at prevailing market rates." Id. (applicable to member banks); 48 Fed. Reg.
57,110 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 349.2(d)) (applicable to state insured nonmember
banks).
161 The statute prohibits extensions of credit to executive officers, directors or
shareholders having the power to vote more than 10% of any class of voting securities or
to any related interest of such shareholder. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(A) (1982).
'6, 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(A), (C) (1982). Specifically, the statute prohibits an extension
of credit unless it is "made on substantially the same terms, including interest rates and
collateral as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with other persons
and does not involve more than the normal risk of repayment or present other unfavorable
features." 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(A).
165 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(B), (D) (1982).
66 A principal shareholder is "any person.., that directly, or indirectly, owns, con-
trois, or has power to vote more than 10 percent of any class of the voting securities of
the member bank. The term includes a person that controls a principal shareholder (e.g.,
a person that controls a bank holding company)." 12 C.F.R. § 215.10(a)(2) (1982) (ap-
plicable to member banks). See also 48 Fed. Reg. 57,110 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §
349.2(h)) (applicable to state insured nonmember banks).
,67 The report must include the maximum amount of indebtedness of the executive
officer or principal shareholder and each of that person's related interests to each of the
bank's correspondent banks during the calendar year, the amount of such indebtedness
outstanding to each of the bank's correspondent banks not more than ten business days
before the report required is filed, and a description of the terms and conditions (including
the range of interest rates, the original amount and date, maturity date, payment terms,
security, if any, and any other unusual terms and conditions) of each extension of credit
included in the reported indebtedness. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(G)(i). See also 12 C.F.R. §
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to their bank of any extension of credit' 8 from any correspondent
bank 69 they or any of their related interests have had outstanding
during the previous calendar year. 7" Each bank must advise every
principal shareholder and executive officer of the required report
and of the name and address of each of its correspondent banks.'"
H. Monitoring the Conduct of Non-Directors
Not only may there be statutory liability to participating direc-
tors for violation of the above statutes, but directors may also be
liable for negligence in not preventing such violations by others on
behalf of the bank. 17 Therefore, it is incumbent upon the direc-
tors to include all such matters in the bank's established policies
and to install reasonable procedures to ensure that the policies are
followed.
215.22(b) (applicable to member banks); 48 Fed. Reg. 57,110 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 349.3(b)(3)) (applicable to state insured nonmember banks).
"' Extensions of credit which do not have to be reported include "(i) [c]ommercial
paper, bonds and debentures issued in the ordinary course of business, and (ii) consumer
credit . . . in an aggregate amount of $5,000 or less ... provided the indebtedness is in-
curred under terms that are not more favorable than those offered to the general public."
12 C.F.R. § 215.22(c) (applicable to member banks); 48 Fed. Reg. 57,110 (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. § 349.2(f)) (applicable to state insured nonmember banks).
"I A correspondent bank is defined as
a bank that maintains one or more correspondent accounts for a member bank
during a calendar year that in the aggregate exceed an average daily balance
during that year of $100,000 or .05 percent of such member bank's total
deposits (as reported in its first consolidated report of condition during that
calendar year), which ever amount is smaller.
12 C.F.R. § 215.21(d) (1983) (applicable to member banks); 48 Fed. Reg. 57,110 (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 349.2(e)) (applicable to state insured nonmember banks).
170 12 C.F.R. § 215.22 (applicable to member banks); 48 Fed. Reg. 57,110 (applicable
to state insured nonmember banks).
-71 12 C.F.R. § 215.22(e); 48 Fed. Reg. 57,110.
172 See, e.g., Gerner v. Mosher, 78 N.W. 384, 387 (Neb. 1899) (a private individual
was granted relief as to director defendants for common law deceit in making false reports
to the Comptroller of the Currency). See also Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. at 132 (action
was brought for directors' breach of their fiduciary duties as well as for their breach of
the federal banking laws); Hoehn v. Crews, 44 F.2d 665, 672 (10th Cir. 1944) (directors
supervising the liquidation of a bank have both a statutory and a common law liability
in the discharge of their duties); Hughes v. Reed, 46 F.2d 435, 439 (10th Cir. 1931)
("Specific" duties placed upon bank directors by statute do not "relieve such directors from
the common law duty to be honest and diligent"); Gamble v. Brown, 29 F.2d 366, 370
(4th Cir. 1928) (the duties imposed on bank directors by the NBA exist in conjunction with
the common law duty of ordinary care), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 839 (1928).
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IV. TiH DUTY OF DIRECTORS TO INVESTIGATE
It may not be enough to establish policies and rely on manage-
ment's reports as to compliance. Directors have a duty to make
sure management complies with established policies and must in-
vestigate management's actions, taking remedial steps where
necessary.'"7  Generally, noncompliance can be discovered by
periodic outside examinations. Such examinations have proven to
be an effective defense to allegations of negligence.' 74 While all
banks are now under periodic examination by their respective
regulatory agencies, it would be unwise to rely upon such examiners
to report irregularities to the board of directors. 175 The courts have
held that such examinations are for purposes other than helping
directors properly manage and oversee the bank.'76 Thus, it would
be advisable for the board to retain skilled outside accounting firms
to perform periodic audits on the bank and render financial and
management performance reports to the board. Moreover, such
reports should not be under management's control,177 but should
be controlled by an audit committee of the directors, 7 8 whose
membership changes periodically.
'" See FDIC v. Mason, 115 F.2d 548, 550-51 (3d Cir. 1940) (bank directors held liable
for not hiring an auditor after becoming aware of accounting deficiency); Ringeon v. Albin-
son, 35 F.2d 753, 754-55 (D. Minn. 1929) (directors liable for failing to act upon learning
of officers' imprudent extension of excessive loans); Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 171
N.E. 42, 44-45 (Mass. 1930) (directors ignored evidence of bank mismanagement and
breached the duty of their office).
17 See Cory Mann George Corp. v. Old, 23 F.2d 803, 807-08 (4th Cir. 1928) (court
exonerated the directors of negligence in not discovering embezzlement where the direc-
tors audited the accounts of the suspect cashier twice and had independent audits performed
by certified public accountants annually); Scott's Ex'rs v. Young, 21 S.W.2d at 997 (directors
were not negligent where directors and the state banking examiners regularly examined the
bank without discovering the defalcations leading to loss).
"I See First State Bank v. United States, 599 F.2d at 562-63 (bank sued the FDIC
because its examiners failed to advise the bank's board of wrongdoing by its president for
one year after uncovering such activities); Harmsen v. Smith, 586 F.2d 156, 157 (9th Cir.
1978) (failure of the audit by the Comptroller of the Currency led the bank's directors to
sue the Comptroller for negligence).
976 See First State Bank v. United States, 599 F.2d at 563; Harmsen v. Smith, 586
F.2d at 157.
,71 See, e.g., Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 171 N.E. at 50 (management did not
submit a bank examiner's audit to the board of directors although it contained serious
criticisms of the bank operations).
"' See Gamble v. Brown, 29 F.2d at 371 (directors held negligent for not appointing
an audit committee "to exercise a supervision of the business, and to examine ... the af-
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CONCLUSION
If bank directors familiarize themselves with the basic bank-
ing laws, employ managers who are capable of doing the same,
establish policies which give reasonable guidelines to management,
establish procedures under which management will effectively
report to the board, require periodic third party outside audits to
confirm compliance with policy and procedures, and confirm assets
and liabilities, they can maintain peace of mind and a fair degree
of assurance that their individual assets will be reasonably protected
from the claims of the depositors, shareholders, creditors and
regulatory agencies who deal with the bank. However, directors
should remember that the common law still requires the exercise
of ordinary care, diligence and prudence. As the financial industry
changes, so will the problems and risks with which a bank must
deal, and new duties may be forthcoming. For instance, long-range
planning may well be prudent for all banks in this changing en-
vironment. Therefore, the position of bank director can no longer
be merely an honorary title, but must be accepted as a challenge
requiring constant exercise of good business judgment, integrity
and intelligence. Directors must be willing to work with bank
management to achieve success for the bank while maintaining the
reasonable detachment necessary to evaluate management's opera-
tion of the bank. The proper discharge of the function of a direc-
tor, while not quite reaching the difficulty and scope of the Twelve
Tasks of Hercules, certainly compares with the cleaning of the
Augean stables.
fairs of the bank... and to report the result of their examination in writing to the board").
See also Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 171 N.E. at 50 (directors are chargeable with the
knowledge a competent and disinterested audit would have revealed).
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